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Abstract: This paper considers the extent to which the common law
does or should protect fundamental human rights. It begins with refer-
ence to suggestions in various jurisdictions that there are some rights
that are deeply rooted in common law, and which could not be inter-
fered with by Parliament. It considers the position of common law rights
in jurisdictions such as Australia with a written Constitution, and the
extent to which rights are found in the common law or the Constitution
or both, and the relation between the common law and the Constitu-
tion. It considers the possible theoretical underpinning of such sug-
gestions, from a social contract, sovereignty and rule of law perspective.
In so doing, it is acknowledged that, contrary to Diceyan theory,
Parliaments do in fact act to take away fundamental rights, and it is
argued to be simplistic to assume that the remedy for such behaviour is
to be found at the ballot box, and never in the courts. Finally, arguments
against the notion of rights protected by the common law are con-
sidered, including Parliamentary supremacy, arguments about demo-
cracy, and suggestions of ‘judicial activism’.
Keywords: common law, sovereignty, social contract theory, Dicey,
Parliamentary supremacy, human rights, common law rights
I. Introduction
In recent years, we have seen substantial legislative incursion into the
rights of individuals. This raises the issue of the extent to which, if at
all, the common law and/or the Australian Constitution are or should
be a brake on the ability of Parliament to curtail human rights. To
what extent is a Parliament, subject to the Constitution, able to take
away fundamental common law rights and liberties? The debate takes
place in the context of the broader philosophical debate between
natural law and legal positivism, and involves important questions of
sovereignty and democracy. While the main focus of this paper is on
the position in Australia, the paper draws upon, and is relevant to,
perspectives on human rights in a range of jurisdictions.
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In Part II, jurisprudence from a range of jurisdictions is considered
suggestive of the idea that the common law protects or is protective of
rights against intrusion by Parliament. In Part III, it is considered
whether, if such rights do exist, they exist at common law, pursuant to
the Australian Constitution, or both, and whether this makes a differ-
ence. In doing so, the relationship between the common law and the
Australian Constitution must be considered. In Part IV, it is argued
that support exists for the proposition that the Constitution protects
implied human rights, both textually and philosophically. The paper
draws here on comments made by several members of the High Court
in terms of a right to due process, Lockean theory of the social con-
tract and the sovereignty of the people, and the rule of law.
In Part V, possible arguments against the idea that human rights
should be implied from the Australian Constitution are considered,
including the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, arguments about
democracy, arguments that the founding fathers did not incorporate a
bill of rights in the Australian Constitution, and questions of ‘judicial
activism’. Conclusions are drawn in Part VI. The paper does not con-
sider the well-established practice of the court presuming that legisla-
tion was not intended to interfere with common law rights, or
resolving any ambiguity in the interpretation of legislation in favour
of the protection of common law rights and liberties.
II. Jurisprudence Suggesting that the Common Law Can be
Used to Protect Rights from Parliamentary Intrusion
Of course, the orthodox Diceyan constitutional view has been that
Parliament is able to enact any law it wishes, and it is not for a court to
declare a law to be invalid. This doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy
has been accepted, as we will see, for centuries in Great Britain,
traditionally in absolute terms (though this is changing, as we will
see), and also has general acceptance in Australian constitutional
thought, subject to recognition of our constitutional arrangements
and the existence of judicial review.1
Notwithstanding this, in a range of jurisdictions there has appeared
a contrary suggestion, namely that the ability of Parliament to pass
laws invasive of human rights might be limited by some common law
constraints.2
i. Britain
The leading historical case supporting the proposition that there are
some common law rights so fundamental that Parliament cannot
1 As Gleeson CJ recently noted in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR
162 at 172, the framers of the Australian Constitution admired and respected
British institutions, including Parliamentary supremacy, and the Constitution
reflected such notions.
2 Such constraints not necessarily being limited to the rule of law, or of interpretive
techniques alluded to above.
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override them is the one commonly known as Dr Bonham’s Case3
where Coke claimed (in dicta):
And it appears in our books that in many cases the common law will
controul [sic] acts of parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be
utterly void; for when an act of parliament is against common right or
reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common law
will controul it and adjudge such act to be void.4
Coke’s views can be linked with those of Fortescue, who had earlier
applied the theories of Aristotle and Aquinas in the English context,
concluding that the common law was a divine and rational embodi-
ment of the ius naturale.5 Coke only partly identified the common law
with natural law.6
Several cases prior to Dr Bonham’s Case appeared to confirm the
possibility that a statute could be declared invalid due to inconsistency
with the common law,7 or that a statute ‘could not be obeyed’ because
3 The Case of the College of Physicians (1609) 8 Co. Rep 107a; 77 ER 638; 2 Brown.
255; 123 ER 928.
4 8 Co. Rep 118a; 77 ER 652. Debate continues over whether Coke was advocating
full blown judicial review or whether he meant merely an interpretation power to
avoid obvious ambiguity or absurd results. Those in favour of the former view
include Raoul Berger, ‘Doctor Bonham’s Case: Statutory Construction or
Constitutional Theory?’ (1969) 117 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 521;
Edward Corwin, ‘The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration
of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention’ (1925) 30
American Historical Review 511; Allen Boyer, ‘Understanding, Authority and Will:
Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review’ (1997) 39 Boston
College Law Review 43; J.W. McKenna, ‘The Myth of Parliamentary Sovereignty
in Late-Medieval England’ (1979) 94 English Historical Review 481; the latter view
is favoured by: E.W. Thorne, ‘Dr Bonham’s Case’ (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review
543; John Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Clarendon
Press: Oxford, 1955); R.A. MacKay, ‘Coke—Parliamentary Supremacy or the
Supremacy of the Law?’ (1924) 22 Michigan Law Review 215; and Theodore
Plunknett, ‘Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review’ (1926) 40 Harvard Law Review 30.
5 Sir Edward Coke, Le Size Part des Reports Del Sr. Edw. Coke Chivalier, Chief
Justice de Common Bank (1697); the preface quotes Sir John Fortescue’s De
Laudibus Leges Anglie (c.1470) ch. 17; see Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglie,
Stanley Chrimes (ed. and trs.) (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1949)
39–41.
6 David Smallbone, ‘Recent Suggestions of an Implied Bill of Rights in the
Constitution, Considered as Part of a General Trend in Constitutional
Interpretation’ (1993) 21 Federal Law Review 254 at 262. Chief Justice of New
South Wales James Spigelman spoke recently of a ‘resurgence of the philosophy
of natural law in common law systems for the first time in three centuries’: The
Common Law Bill of Rights, first lecture in the 2008 McPherson Lectures, 10
March 2008, p. 2.
7 In Copper v Gederings, YB 3 Edw II, 105, a statute provided that a right of action
should descend from a lord to his heir; Chief Justice Bereford refused an action
based on the statute, on the basis that if it were allowed, common law principles
would be disturbed: Fitzherbert Natura Brevium (Hale’s ed. 1755) p. 209; Calvin’s
Case (1608) 7 Co. Rep 1a; 77 ER 377, the court declared that the laws of nature
could not be changed or taken away, ‘we of England are united by birthright, in
obedience and ligeance by the law of nature . . . the Parliament could not take
away that protection which the law of nature giveth’ (13b, 14a, 14b, 392–4).
121
THE COMMON LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION AS PROTECTORS OF RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA
of its inconsistency with church law.8 Perhaps unfortunately, this issue
sometimes arose in the context of a conflict between a royal (common
law) prerogative and a statute. The word ‘unfortunate’ is used because
questions of the royal prerogative may have inadvertently got caught
up with other general common law principles, in considering the
impact of the Glorious Revolution on common law rights. Smallbone
writes that
If Parliament was not, before the Bill of Rights, an absolute sovereign,
there is nothing in the Bill of Rights which takes matters so far as to
convert Parliament into a Hobbesian Leviathan.9
Where sovereignty originally resided in the monarch, the monarch
appointed a number of advisers to the Parliament, and the Parlia-
ment’s role was to advise the monarch on a range of issues, including
laws. There was a difference of opinion as to the authority of Parlia-
ment: on the one hand, royalists believed the monarch alone made
statutes and the High Court of Parliament possessed sovereignty as
the monarch’s highest seat of judgment; on the other hand, parlia-
mentarians believed statutes were made by the King and members of
Parliament (Lords and Commons) as three partners sharing law-
making functions.10 These differences form part of the backdrop of the
great conflicts between the monarch and Parliament that preceded
the Glorious Revolution.11 There is record, at least prior to the Glori-
ous Revolution, of statutes being interpreted not to trample over
8 Annuitie 41, translated in Pasch. 27 Hen VI, where a statute required that the
common seal of an abbot should be under the control of the prior and four
others; this conflicted with established church practice. In 1506, Chief Justice
Frowicke agreed that an Act without the consent of the Pope was not enforceable:
A.R. Myers, ‘Parliament, 1422–1509’ in Richard Davies and Jeffrey Denton (eds),
The English Parliament in the Middle Ages (Manchester University Press:
Manchester, 1981) 141–84. In 1529, Parliament’s ability to legislate with respect to
spiritual matters was doubted (Geoffrey Elton, The Parliament of England
1559–1581 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986) 34), and Jeffrey
Goldsworthy notes that at a meeting of leading clergy and lawyers in 1530, a
majority advised Henry VIII that Parliament could not authorize the Archbishop
of Canterbury to grant Henry’s divorce where the Pope objected: Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1999) 50. Goldsworthy claims that Parliamentary
supremacy was established after the Reformation Parliament transferred supreme
authority over the English Church from the Pope to the King in the 1530s.
9 See Smallbone, above n. 6 at 267. Cf. Sir David Lindsay Keir who argues that
‘sovereignty in 1688 was for practical purposes grasped by the nation . . . Thus
perished, at the hands of an assembly animated by an authority which can hardly
be otherwise regarded than as popular sovereignty in action, the idea of a sacred
and inalienable governmental power, inherent in kings possessing a divine,
indefeasible, hereditary title’: The Constitutional History of Modern Britain (A&C
Black: London, 1960) 270. Smallbone says the sovereignty grasped after 1688 was
a political one rather than a legal one (267).
10 See Goldsworthy, above n. 8 at 63–75.
11 This includes the belief of James I that he was above the law, and the fatal clash
between Charles I and the Parliament, leading to a lengthy proroguing of
Parliament and a temporary republican form of government.
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Crown prerogatives, at least where it would lead to absurdity.12 The
authority of the Crown was at that time paramount.13
The authority of Dr Bonham’s Case was confirmed in subsequent
cases, both before14 and after15 the Glorious Revolution. Again reflect-
ing natural law theory of this time (writing in 1765), Blackstone was
adamant that:
Acts of Parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no valid-
ity, and if there arises out of them collaterally any absurd consequences,
manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to
those collateral consequences, void.16
Wood in 1724 published a list of rules of statutory interpretation,
including one that ‘Acts of Parliament that are against Reason, or
impossible to be performed, shall be judged void’.17
On the other hand, there are many authorities of ancient origin that
appear to confirm a form of Parliamentary supremacy, as we would
12 3 Dyer 313 (KB 1572); Lord Bacon in his Maxims, regula xix (7 Bacon Works
(James Spedding ed. 1879) 369–72), notes that ‘a patent of a sheriff’s office made
by the king for term of life . . . will be good in law, contrary to such statute which
pretendeth to exclude [it]; and the reason is, because it is an inseparable
prerogative of the Crown to dispense with politic statutes’; in The Prior of Castle
Acre v The Dean of St Stephen’s, YB Hil, 21 Hen. VII, 1–5 Chief Justice Frowyke
concluded that an Act could not bind the King without the latter’s consent.
13 Godden v Hales 2 Show, *475 (KB 1686).
14 Lord Sheffield v Ratcliffe, Hobart 334a at 346 (KB 1615) (‘that liberty and authority
that judges have over laws, especially over statute laws, according to reason and
best convenience, to mould them to the truest and best use’); Godden v Hales
(1686) 2 Show 475; 89 ER 1050; Comb 21; 90 ER 318: ‘no Act of Parliament could
take away (the King’s power of dispensation of penal laws)’ (2 Show 478; 89 ER
1051; Comb 25; 90 ER 321; Day v Savadge (1614) Hobart 85 at 87; 80 ER 235 at
237, CP; Rowles v Mason (1612) 2 Brown 192 at 198; 123 ER 892 at 895, CP; The
Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, CP).
15 City of London v Wood, 12 Mod. 669; 88 ER 1592 at 1602; more recently they were
cited by Sir Robin Cooke in New Zealand to support his assertion that some
common law rights were so deep that Parliament could not destroy them: Fraser v
State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116 at 121; Taylor v New Zealand Poultry
Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398; New Zealand Drivers’ Association v New Zealand
Road Carriers [1982] 1 NZLR 374 at 390. Janet Hope confirms that ‘despite
assertions by Street CJ and Kirby P in the BLF Case (Building Construction
Employees and Labourers’ Federation of NSW v Minister for Industrial Relations
(1986) 7 NSWLR 372) to the effect that (Coke’s dicta) did not survive the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, it has been pointed out that the doctrine of common law
rights was restated in the English courts several times in the course of the
eighteenth century’: ‘A Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial? Implications for the
Reform of the Australian Criminal Justice System’ (1996) 24 Federal Law Review
173 at 187.
16 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries (1st edn, 1765) 91; although he made it
clear subsequently that the mere fact that legislation was considered
‘unreasonable’ was not in his view grounds to reject it.
17 Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England: Or the Laws of England in
their Natural Order, according to Common Use, 3rd edn (W. Strahan &
M. Woodfall: London, 1772) 4; see also Sir Henry Finch, A Description of the
Common Laws of England (A. Miller: London, 1759): ‘laws which do in reality
contradict the law of Reason are null and void, as well as those which contradict
the Laws of Nature’ (53).
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today understand it.18 For example, in 1454 Chief Justice Fortescue
stated that the High Court of Parliament was ‘so high and so mighty
in its nature’ that questions concerning its privileges could not be
decided by the judges.19 St German insisted that a court could not
judge a law to be void; this ability existed only in the High Court of
Parliament.20 Part of the thinking at this time was that Parliament
could always be trusted to legislate for the common good, and that
Parliament would not violate God’s law.21 In this we see the historical
basis for Dicey’s theory some centuries later.
We should also acknowledge during this period that judges did not
enjoy the kind of judicial independence and security of tenure that we
expect today. They could be dismissed by the King, and impeached by
Parliament.22 It is reported that six of the judges who decided the Ship
Money case in favour of the King as opposed to the Parliament were
subsequently impeached by Parliament.23 In this context, it is perhaps
not surprising that many judges were reluctant to assert their
supremacy over the Parliament. As Goldsworthy notes of this time:
When Parliament asserted its authority in novel and controversial ways,
for example, to destroy papal jurisdiction in the sixteenth century, and
to control the prerogatives of the Crown in the seventeenth century,
the judges were virtually compelled by political circumstances to
acquiesce—although in the second case, only after many of them were
impeached, and their decisions overturned by statute.24
Of course, Parliamentary supremacy became the dominant philo-
sophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but recently there
has been some resurgence of the idea that the common law limits the
authority of Parliament. A leading scholar here is Allan, who argues
that the rule of law must be given due prominence, such that laws
18 In conceding this, we should acknowledge some ambiguity, since Parliament in
these historical times (i.e. prior to the Glorious Revolution) was not democratically
elected, and was composed of appointees of the monarch. Further, ‘Parliament’
during these periods performed a greater role than the mere legislative,
apparently exercising a range of powers including legislative, judicial and
executive powers. This makes it more difficult to state categorically that a
legislative body had been recognized as the supreme law-making body, when it
might in the alternative be argued that it was a judicial body that had been
recognized as the supreme law-making body. This is why Parliament at that time
was referred to as the ‘High Court of Parliament’. Much more of this interesting
history is found in, for example, Goldsworthy, above n. 10 at chs 3–7.
19 Stanley Chrimes (ed.), Select Documents of English Constitutional History
1307–1485 (A&C Black: London, 1961) 296. 
20 ‘A Little Treatise Concerning Writs of Subpoena’ in John Guy, Christopher St
German on Chancery and Statute (Selden Society: London, 1985) 116. 
21 See Goldsworthy, above n. 10 at 73.
22 This is a key distinction. Dicey noted of the American Supreme Court that ‘the
Court derives its existence from the Constitution, and stands therefore on an
equality with the President and with Congress; the members thereof . . . hold their
places during good behaviour, at salaries which cannot be diminished during a
judge’s tenure of office’: Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of
the Constitution, 8th edn (Macmillan: London, 1926) 155.
23 See Goldsworthy, above n. 10 at 107.
24 Ibid. at 243.
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offending principles of equality should be struck down.25 Allan con-
cludes that:
The limits on the power of a democratic majority to achieve its legis-
lative will are ultimately to be found in the common law; and the com-
mon law is too subtle to tolerate the absurdity—even constitutional
contradiction—of wholly unlimited legislative power.26
Most recently Lord Steyn of the House of Lords has stated, in dicta,
that:
We do not in the United Kingdom have an uncontrolled constitution as
the Attorney General implausibly asserts . . . The classic account given
by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and
absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern
United Kingdom.27
In the same case, Lord Hope claimed (again in dicta) that:
Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute. It is not
uncontrolled in the sense referred to by Lord Birkenhead LC in
McCawley v King [1920] AC 691, 720. It is no longer right to say that its
freedom to legislate admits of no qualification whatever. Step by step,
gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative
sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Black-
stone is being qualified. For the most part these qualifications are them-
selves the product of measures enacted by Parliament.28
Lord Hope referred with apparent approval to the extra-judicial com-
ments of Sir Owen Dixon about the ‘supremacy throughout the con-
stitution of ordinary law’.29
In Britain then, there has long been disagreement between the view
that the law-making body is subject to some fundamental common
law liberties and the ideology of legal positivism that has been perva-
sive in more recent times.
ii. America
The arguments of Coke and others were used by those in the Amer-
ican colonies resisting the Stamp Acts legislation, to assert that the
legislation was contrary to the Magna Carta and natural rights, and
so should not be followed. These arguments were used to seek to
25 Trevor Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Int Comm
Jurists: New Delhi, 2001); ‘Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention:
Interpretation, Meaning and Authority’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 685.
26 Trevor Allan, ‘The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First
Principles’ in Cheryl Saunders (ed.), Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court
in Australia (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996) 156.
27 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2006] 1 AC 262 at 302 (dicta); Lord Mance,
‘Britain’s Emerging Constitution?’ (2008) Oxford University Comparative Law
Forum 1.
28 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General, 303–4, referring specifically to the entry of the
United Kingdom into the European Union, and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
29 Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review
590 at 596.
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strike down slavery legislation,30 and the specific question of jury
rights was considered by the Rhode Island Superior Court in 1786 (i.e.
post-independence) in Trevett v Weeden. There an Act allowed trial
without jury for a charge of refusing to accept the state’s currency.
The defendant argued that the law was contrary to the Magna Carta
and sought to take away the fundamental right to trial by jury. Lord
Coke was cited in support of these arguments. The Act was appar-
ently held to be unconstitutional and void.31 A stronger precedent is
Bowman v Middleton where the court clearly expressed its decision to
invalidate an Act of Parliament clarifying the boundary between two
properties on the basis that it was ‘against common right and Magna
Carta . . . the act was therefore ipso facto void’.32 The Supreme Court
of the United States has also resorted to this reasoning to set aside
legislation, quite independently of any express provisions in the Bill of
Rights.33
Of course, one of the reasons for the growing independence move-
ment in the United States in the 1760s and 1770s was the dissatisfac-
tion with taxation of the colonies by the British, in particular the
Sugar Act, Stamp Act and Townshend Duties of 1767. Part of the
argument against these laws was that they involved ‘taxation without
representation’, or in other words taxation levied by a Parliament not
answerable to those required to pay the taxes. It was argued that this
made the taxes illegal and invalid. Underpinning such arguments is
the notion that some statutes passed by Parliament are not valid, and
that it is proper for a court to declare them to be contrary to funda-
mental law and ineffective for that reason.
A leading writer at the time, Otis, condemned taxation without
representation as violative of ‘the law of God and nature’ and the
‘common law’ that no person, not excepting Parliament, could take
away.34 John Dickinson wrote of rights that ‘are born with us; exist
with us; and cannot be taken away from us by any human power’. The
Continental Congress in 1774 declared that Americans had the right
‘by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English con-
stitution, and the several charters or compacts . . . to life, liberty and
30 Robin et al. v Hardaway et al., Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772).
31 Thomas Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (Little, Brown: Boston, 1903) 229; this
finding was apparently so controversial at the time that the judges were
immediately summoned to the General Assembly to explain their decision:
Plunknett, above n. 4 at 67.
32 I Bay, 252 (SC 1792).
33 For example Fletcher v Peck (1810) 10 US 87 (Johnson J referred to a Georgian
statute affecting land rights as violating general principles of justice (143);
Marshall CJ declared the Act invalid because of general principles common to
free institutions (139); refer more generally to Leslie Zines, ‘A Judicially Created
Bill of Rights?’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166 and Smallbone, above n. 6.
34 James Otis, ‘The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved’ in 1
Pamphlets of the American Revolution 409 at 444; citing Dr Bonham’s Case as
supportive of his views (476); see also Daniel Dulany, ‘Considerations on the
Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies’ in 1 Pamphlets of the
American Revolution 610 at 612.
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property which no one had a right to dispose of without their con-
sent’.35 Various colonial constitutions written prior to 1776 were also
premised on the fact that common law rights existed prior to, and
were higher than, legislative authority. The purpose of an express bill
of rights was merely to document such rights, not to introduce new
rights, but to confirm what was already there.36
The Lockean-influenced United States Declaration of Independence
reflects similar sentiments:
All men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable [emphasis added] Rights; that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
Two of the specific grievances noted by the authors include the at-
tempts of the English to deny the right to trial by jury to many citizens
of the American colonies, and other attempts to take away ‘our
Charters’.
There are clear links between these assertions and the acceptance
of judicial review by the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v
Madison,37 and clear links between the insistence on these common
law rights and the eventual adoption in that nation of a bill of rights,
obviating at least to some extent the need to argue on the basis of the
common law. The link is shown pre-independence days in the Charter
of Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey which began with a provi-
sion that:
the common law or fundamental rights of the colony should be the
foundation of government, which is not to be altered by the legislative
authority.38
It is shown in post-independence days by the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, planning for the evolution of territories to statehood. It is said to
be the first federal document to contain a bill of rights.39 The docu-
ment states that in order to extend ‘the fundamental principles of civil
and religious liberty’, Congress included articles that were to remain
35 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 67 (Worthington Ford ed. 1904); see
Thomas Grey, ‘Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought’ (1978) 30 Stanford Law Review 843.
36 For example, the Charter of Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey (1677)
commences with a provision that ‘the common law or fundamental rights of the
colony should be the foundation of government, which is not to be altered by the
legislative authority’.
37 1 Cranch, 137 (US 1803); Michael Kirby notes that the comments of Coke and
others ‘in the century before the Foundation of the American Republic . . .
undoubtedly laid the foundation for the doctrine expressed in Marbury v
Madison’: Deep Lying Rights—A Constitutional Conversation Continues, The Robin
Cooke Lecture 2004, p. 4; the Marbury decision was referred to with approval by
the High Court of Australia in Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth
(1951) 83 CLR 1 at 262 (Fullagar J claiming that the principles from Marbury were
‘axiomatic’).
38 (1677).
39 Leonard Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights (Yale University Press: New Haven,
1999) 11.
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‘forever unalterable’, guaranteeing to citizens rights such as habeas
corpus, trial by jury, representative government, judicial proceedings
‘according to the course of the common law’. As Levy concludes:
The American colonial experience, climaxed by the controversy with
England leading to the Revolution, honed American sensitivity to the
need for written constitutions that protected rights grounded in the
‘immutable laws of nature’ as well as in the British constitution and
colonial charters.40
However, importantly in the Australian context, the common law
rights were recognized prior to, and independently of, any express
bills of rights.41 Those who argued against the express bill of rights
in America used the argument that there was no need because the
government could not encroach on ‘reserved’ rights.42 A related argu-
ment was that if some express rights were conferred, other rights
might not be respected. In order to meet such objections, the Ninth
Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly recognizes
that although some express rights are found in the Constitution, this
does not deny or disparage others retained by the people.
iii. Australia
This issue was canvassed by the High Court of Australia in Union
Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King.43 In rejecting the suggestion
that the words ‘peace, welfare and good government’ were words of
limitation,44 the court nevertheless canvassed other possibilities:
Whether the exercise of . . . legislative power is subject to some re-
straints by reference to rights deeply rooted in our democratic system
and the common law, a view which Lord Reid firmly rejected in Pickin v
British Railway Board,45 is another question which we need not
explore.46
40 Ibid. at 8.
41 This is similar to the assumption within the English Bill of Rights 1689, that the
document was reciting existing common law rights that were fundamental and
beyond reproach: ‘that all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and
claimed in the said declaration, are the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and
liberties of the people of this kingdom . . . and shall be firmly and strictly holden
and observed . . . all officers and ministers whatsoever shall serve their Majesties
and their successors according to the same in all times to come.’
42 Among others, Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth and James
Madison expressed these views: Levy, above n. 39 at 244.
43 (1988) 166 CLR 1.
44 Ian Killey, ‘Peace, Order and Good Government: A Limitation on Legislative
Competence’ (1990) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 24.
45 [1974] AC 765 at 782.
46 This comment is similar to comments of Toohey J in Polyukovich v
Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501 at 687 who considered that the question
whether a statute could declare a statute to be invalid because it was unjust was
an open one. In Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Pty Ltd (1994) 182 CLR
104, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ noted that the framers of the Constitution
considered that the ultimate protection of important rights was found in the
common law (128).
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In a series of decisions, Murphy J suggested several rights were im-
plied by the Australian Constitution,47 including freedom of speech,
assembly, communication and travel throughout the Commonwealth,
freedom from slavery, serfdom, civil conscription, cruel and unusual
punishment, arbitrary discrimination on the grounds of sex, and self-
determination.48 These rights were said to be inherent in a free and
democratic society.49
Deane and Toohey JJ are on record as having decided that federal
(and possibly state) legislative power was subject to fundamental
principles of the common law;50 specifically in Leeth these judges
recognized a common law doctrine of the underlying equality of all
persons under the law and before the courts. This was drawn from
the agreement of the people to unite in a Commonwealth.51 Gaudron J
agreed with the result but justified it on the basis of an inherent
requirement of the exercise of federal judicial power,52 and Brennan J
agreed that the doctrine was an implied limitation on Commonwealth
legislative power.53 Toohey expanded on his views extra-judicially. In
suggesting that the High Court could as ‘guardian of a written con-
stitution within the context of a liberal democratic society’ imply limits
on government power:
It might be thought that, in construing a constitution, to deny plenary
scope to heads of power where a wide reading would afford capacity to
infringe fundamental liberties is an analogous approach to that which is
well settled in relation to the construction of statutes . . . Where the
people of Australia, in adopting a constitution, conferred power to legis-
late with respect to various subject matters upon a Commonwealth
Parliament, it is to be presumed that they did not intend that those
grants of power extend to invasion of fundamental common law
47 In similar vein, Kirby J in Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205
CLR 399 suggested that the sovereignty of the Australian people might mean
there are implications derived from the Constitution that limit the power of
Parliaments (431).
48 McGraw-Hinds (Aust) Pty Ltd v Smith (1979) 144 CLR 633 at 670; Ansett Transport
Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wardley (1980) 142 CLR 237 at 267; Uebergang v
Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR 266 at 312; Sillery v R (1981) 180 CLR 353
at 362; and Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556 at 581.
49 While Murphy J’s views were based on implications from the Constitution, as
Winterton says Murphy J did not state which sections he was referring to, and
the view might be considered equally as one advocating that certain common law
rights were fundamental and untouchable in a Lockean tradition of natural rights:
George Winterton, ‘Constitutionally Entrenched Common Law Rights: Sacrificing
Means to Ends?’ in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting
Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions (Federation Press: Sydney,
1996) 131.
50 Leeth v The Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455 at 486–7; Nationwide News Pty
Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 69.
51 Ibid. at 486.
52 Ibid. at 502.
53 Ibid. at 475.
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liberties—a presumption only rebuttable by express authorisation in the
constitution document.54
These tantalizing comments mirror the interesting comments made
about the issue by Sir Owen Dixon in his extra-judicial writings:
The principles of the common law with respect to the interpretation and
operation of a statute may be supposed to account in great measure for
the form and method of modern legislation. The form and the method
that are established imply real limitations. A rhetorical question may be
enough to make this clear. Would it be within the capacity of a parlia-
mentary draftsman to frame, for example, a provision replacing a deep-
rooted legal doctrine with a new one?55
It seems clear that Dixon’s answer to this question would have been
‘no’. Dixon spoke of the common law as a jurisprudence ‘antecedently
existing into which our system came and in which it operates’.56 He
believed that the common law was the source of the authority of the
British Parliament,57 and as a result that constitutional questions had
to be resolved in the context of the whole law, including the common
law.58 His thoughts are expressed further in Australian Communist
Party v The Commonwealth where in discussing Australia’s constitu-
tional arrangements, he said that:
It is government under the Constitution and that is an instrument
framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of
which it gives effect, as for example, in separating the judicial power
from other functions of government, others of which are simply
assumed. Among these I think that it may fairly be said that the rule of
law forms an assumption.59
54 John Toohey, ‘A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?’ (1993) 4 Public Law
Review 158 at 170. See also Allan, above n. 26: ‘there are surely some rights at
common law which . . . lie too deep for constitutional amendment or repeal;
freedoms so elementary . . . that it was unnecessary to mention them in the
Constitution because they arise by implication from the concept of the
Commonwealth itself. Could the Australian Constitution be amended to eliminate
freedom of political speech, or the right to a fair trial, or the independence of the
judiciary? To assume an affirmative answer to such questions is arbitrarily to
privilege the principle of majority rule at the expense of other features of liberal
democracy’ (158).
55 Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation’
(1957) 31 Australian Law Journal 240 at 241; refer also to ‘Sources of Legal
Authority’ in Jesting Pilate (Law Book Co.: Melbourne, 1965) 199: ‘the anterior
operation of the common law in Australia [was] not just dogma of our legal
system, an abstraction of our constitutional reasoning. It is a fact of our legal
history’; Michael Wait, ‘The Slumbering Sovereign: Sir Owen Dixon’s Common
Law Constitution Revisited’ (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 57.
56 Ibid. at 240.
57 Ibid. at 242.
58 Ibid. at 245. He claimed that the common law ‘developed no legal doctrine that all
legislatures by their very nature were supreme over the law. The doctrine of the
supremacy of Parliament related to the Parliament of Westminster’: Dixon, above
n. 55, Jesting Pilate at 200.
59 (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193; writing of these comments in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth
(1998) 195 CLR 337, Gummow and Hayne JJ said that the ‘occasion has yet to
arise for consideration of all that may follow from the statement’ ([89]); see also
O’Connor J in Potter v Minahan (1907) 7 CLR 277 at 304 who referred with
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
130
Similarly, Windeyer J (writing extra-judicially) discussed the concept:
Implicit and not analysed, but basic—of common law as the ultimate
foundation of British colonial institutions, a belief that not even Parlia-
ment could properly deprive British subjects anywhere of their
birthright.60
It is submitted that these views would mean that a statute invasive of
human rights might be declared invalid because of its inconsistency
with the common law. The reasoning would be that Parliaments
derive their authority to pass legislation from the Commonwealth
Constitution. If the Commonwealth Constitution was subject to the
common law as its ‘foundation’, then it would follow that legislation
incompatible with the common law would be invalid for that reason.
In other words, though he did not expressly make the link, it might be
said that Dixon’s views were consistent with the pure theory of law
philosophy of Hans Kelsen, who spoke of laws as a series of norms,
deriving their authority from higher norms. At the top of these series
of norms stood the ‘grundnorm’, the basic norm from which all norms
within the system derived their validity.61 Dixon was saying that the
common law was the grundnorm, against which the validity of all
other norms was to be tested.
iv. New Zealand
Sir Robin Cooke, former President of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal, argued in a series of cases62 that some common law rights
‘presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not override
them’. He included on the list freedom from torture, the right of
access to the courts, natural justice, and a prohibition on abdication of
power. Writing extra-judicially, he added:
The modern common law should be seen to have a free and democratic
society as its basic tenet and, for that reason, to be built on two com-
plementary and lawfully unalterable principles: the operation of a demo-
cratic legislature and the operation of independent courts . . . The
approval to comments by the author of Maxwell on Statutes, 4th edn (Sweet &
Maxwell: London, 1962) 121 to the effect that ‘it is in the last degree improbable
that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or
depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with
irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to general words, simply because
they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to
give them a meaning in which they were not really used’.
60 Sir Victor Windeyer, ‘A Birthright and Inheritance—Establishment of the Rule of
Law in Australia’ (1962) 1 University of Tasmania Law Review 635 at 653.
61 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Max Knight (trs.) (University of California Press:
Berkeley, 1967).
62 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398; New Zealand
Drivers’ Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] 1 NZLR 374 (Cooke,
McMullin and Ongley JJ); L v M [1979] 2 NZLR 519 at 527; Fraser v State Services
Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116 at 121; Brader v Ministry of Transport [1981] 1
NZLR 73 at 78; see also Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General [1994] 2
NZLR 451 at 458 (Gallen J); see also Adam Ross, ‘Diluting Dicey’ (1989) 6 Auckland
University Law Review 176.
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concept of a free democracy must carry with it some limitation on
legislative power . . . Working out truly fundamental rights and duties is
ultimately an inescapable judicial responsibility.63
v. Canada
Some recent Canadian decisions appear to suggest that the common
law is fundamental to that country’s constitutional arrangements. For
example, in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of
the House of Assembly),64 the Supreme Court of Canada found that
the common law of unwritten privileges of regional Houses of Assem-
bly formed part of the supreme and entrenched fundamental law of
Canada, and could not be disturbed by legislation.65
It is clear then that, despite the prevalence of the doctrine of Parlia-
mentary supremacy, there have been suggestions over many years
and across a range of jurisdictions to the effect that the common law
could be utilized to limit the extent to which Parliament could pass
laws invasive of human rights.
III. The Relationship Between the Common Law and the
Constitution
We must consider whether human rights are protected by the com-
mon law, or, in countries such as Australia with a written Constitu-
tion, that document, or some combination of the two. In turn, this
raises questions of the relationship between the common law and the
Constitution, to which I now turn. Which is superior? Which informs
the other?
As indicated, the view of Sir Owen Dixon was that the common law
was the grundnorm:
Federalism means a rigid constitution and a rigid constitution means a
written instrument. It is easy to treat the written instrument as the
paramount consideration, unmindful of the part played by the general
law, notwithstanding that it is the source of the legal conceptions that
govern us in determining the effect of the written instrument.66
63 Sir Robin Cooke, ‘Fundamentals’ [1988] New Zealand Law Journal 158 at 164–5.
64 [1993] 1 SCR 319.
65 Ibid., McLachlin J at 378, 384; in Manitoba Provincial Judges’ Association v
Manitoba (Minister of Justice) [1997] 3 SCR 3, Lamer CJC for the majority found
(obiter) that there was an unwritten principle of judicial independence binding on
legislatures and justiciable in the courts (68). The implications of these decisions
are shown in the judgment of dissentient LaForest J, who argued that
Parliamentary sovereignty was effectively being overturned by the majority
reasoning (para. 319). Refer for further discussion to Mark Walters, ‘The Common
Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law’
(2001) 51 University of Toronto Law Journal 91.
66 Dixon, above n. 55: ‘we are able to avail ourselves of the common law as a
jurisprudence antecedently existing into which our system came and in which it
operates’.
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Suggestions that the common law forms the background to, and con-
trols the meaning of, the Constitution also appear in several cases and
extra-judicial comments by judges. For example, a unanimous High
Court in Cheatle stated:
It is well settled that the interpretation of a Constitution such as ours is
necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the
language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of
the common law’s history.67
In other cases, the High Court has found that the rules of the common
law must yield to constitutional requirements. We saw this in cases
such as Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd,68 where the
court modified the common law of defamation in light of an implied
freedom of political speech.69 In Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, the High Court again claimed that the Constitution over-
ruled any inconsistent rules of the common law, including the doc-
trine of Parliamentary supremacy.70 In Commonwealth v Mewett, it
was established that common law Crown immunities had been effect-
ively abolished by a provision of the Constitution.71 In a different
context in John Pfeiffer v Rogerson,72 the High Court stated that com-
mon law rules of private international law required adaptation in light
of Australia’s constitutional arrangements.73
In the context of the human rights debate, as we have seen, some
judges have preferred to base their grounding of ‘fundamental human
67 Cheatle v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541 at 552. See also Brennan J in
Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 141, stating
that the common law ‘informs the text of the Constitution’. Writing extra-
judicially, Justice Bill Gummow acknowledges that ‘undoubtedly, the Constitution
itself presupposed an operation of the common law in some respects’: ‘The
Constitution: Ultimate Foundation of Australian Law?’ (2005) 79 Australian Law
Journal 167 at 174. Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174
CLR 455 at 485–7 stated that the Constitution is constructed upon fundamental
common law principles. Sir Owen Dixon concluded that it was easy ‘to treat the
written instrument as a paramount consideration, unmindful of the part played
by the general law, notwithstanding that it is the source of the legal conceptions
that govern us in determining the effect of the written instrument’: Jesting Pilate
above n. 55 at 17.
68 (1994) 182 CLR 104.
69 Ibid.; Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ stated that if the Constitution, expressly
or by implication, is at odds with the common law, common law must yield to the
Constitution (126).
70 (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567–8; see Leslie Zines, ‘The Common Law in Australia: Its
Nature and Constitutional Significance’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 337;
Gummow, above n. 67.
71 (1997) 191 CLR 471.
72 (2000) 203 CLR 503 at 534 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne
JJ).
73 The relationship between the Constitution and the common law has attracted the
attention of many writers recently. See, for example, Kathleen Foley, ‘The
Australian Constitution’s Influence on the Common Law’ (2003) 31 Federal Law
Review 131; Adrienne Stone, ‘Freedom of Political Communication, the
Constitution and the Common Law’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 219; and Greg
Taylor, ‘The Effect of the Constitution on the Common Law as Revealed by John
Pfeiffer v Rogerson’ (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 69; ‘Why the Common Law
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rights’ on the Constitution—for example Kirby, Deane, Toohey,
Gaudron and Murphy JJ; while others, including Dixon J, Deane and
Toohey JJ in Australia, Sir Robin Cooke in New Zealand and Lord
Steyn in the United Kingdom, resort to the common law as the basis
of fundamental rights. If it is true that the Constitution affects the
common law, as the High Court has held, it is submitted that it may
not matter whether such rights are grounded in the common law or
the Constitution. Their content is the same, and their effect on legisla-
tion inconsistent with such rights would be the same. An argument
that the rights are implicit in the Constitution would be more appeal-
ing to those who require some written text from which rights are said
to flow, rather than ‘the common law’ which is for some too amorph-
ous.74 It may be that concerns about the legitimacy in a democracy of
common law rights enforced by non-elected judges (which I will dis-
cuss later in the paper) can also be addressed more easily in a context
whereby rights are seen to be implicit in the Constitution which mem-
bers of the High Court are charged with interpreting, rather than
(merely) based on common law.
As a result, it is argued that some fundamental rights (which will be
articulated later) are implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. The
common law is useful as providing, in some cases, several hundred
years of jurisprudence upon which we can draw to elaborate and
understand these rights more fully.
IV. Support for the Implication of Rights in the Constitution
i. The Text
While Dixon J famously concluded that we should not be fearful of
making implications from the text of the Constitution,75 it has taken
some time for the High Court to develop the suggestion of implica-
tions in the text of the Constitution in the area of rights, and great
controversy has arisen when, in particular, the Mason Court adopted
this line of reasoning. Of course, various implications have been
made, initially in favour of implied immunities and reserved power
reasoning,76 later to limits on Commonwealth laws discriminating
Should Be Only Indirectly Affected by Constitutional Guarantees: A Comment on
Stone’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 623; and Pamela Tate, ‘Some
Observations on the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law
Review 119.
74 In dismissing the suggestion that the common law should restrain legislative
power, George Winterton concluded that ‘the common law is too amorphous and
adaptable to constitute an effective constraint’: above n. 49 at 144.
75 ANA Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29 at 85; Lamshed v Lake (1945) 99
CLR 132 at 144; West v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 657 at 681.
76 Until Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28
CLR 129.
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against the states or subjecting them to special burdens or disabil-
ities,77 and during the 1990s the High Court recognized the implied
freedom of political communication.78 Recently, the High Court found
that voting rights were implicitly protected by the structure of the
Constitution.79
Certainly High Court sentiments regarding the separation of
powers as a protector of rights find express textual support in the
Constitution.80 In Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, three
members of the Court agreed that the Constitution required that
judicial power could not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with
the essential character of a court, or the nature of judicial power.81
Judges have expressly linked the separation of powers doctrine to the
concept of due process,82 including the right to a fair trial.83 Links to
the rule of law have also been noted,84 as well as notions of equality.85
There is support for the suggestion that the right to a fair trial would
77 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (State Banking Case) (1947) 74 CLR 31.
78 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
79 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162; I say implicitly here because
the relevant sections do not on their terms state that an individual has a right to
vote (ss 7 and 24). Gleeson CJ in this case stated that despite the general
acceptance of Parliamentary supremacy, this did not necessarily mean that rights
could not be implied in the Constitution (173).
80 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; Chu Kheng Lim
v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1; Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR
173; Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally
Entrenched Due Process in Australia’ (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review
248. Using Kable reasoning, any guarantee of a fair trial held to exist at federal
level could be ‘drawn down’ to the state level where the majority of criminal
matters are heard.
81 (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 26–7; see also Polyukovich v The Commonwealth (1991) 172
CLR 501 at 703.
82 Re Tracey; Ex Parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518 at 580 (Deane J); Re Tyler; Ex Parte
Foley (1994) 181 CLR 18 at 34 (Deane J); Polyukovich v The Commonwealth (1991)
172 CLR 501 at 612–15 (Deane J) and 706–8 (Gaudron J).
83 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292, especially 326 (Deane J) and Gaudron J (362–3);
Michael McHugh J, ‘Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as
Well as Procedural Rights?’ (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235; see also Jago v
District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23. In Cameron (2002) 209 CLR
339 McHugh J spoke of the requirement of ‘equal justice’ required by the
Constitution (352–3); Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III
in the New High Court’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205; Janet Hope, ‘A
Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial? Implications for the Reform of the Australian
Criminal Justice System’ (1996) 24 Federal Law Review 173.
84 Re Nolan; Ex Parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460 at 496; Wheeler, above n. 80 at 254:
‘The Constitution allocates federal judicial power to Chapter III courts in order to
promote the supremacy of law over arbitrary power but that purpose would be
defeated were those courts to proceed in other than a fair and impartial manner’;
‘One of the cornerstones of the rule of law itself is the notion of a fair trial. Fair
trials form an essential part of all legal systems which purport to be founded on
the rule of law’: Rhona Smith, International Human Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2005) 249.
85 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455 (Deane and Gaudron JJ); see also
Gaudron J in Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173 at 208–9 and Ebner v
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 368.
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include important criminal rights such as the presumption of inno-
cence and right to silence,86 both of which have been described by the
High Court as fundamental to our system of criminal justice.87 Due
process has been given an extended meaning in the United States
jurisprudence.88 Justice Brandeis linked separation of power with the
requirements of a democracy thus:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven-
tion of 1787, not to promote efficiency, but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but by means of
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.89
There is evidence that Coke himself believed that the Magna Carta
required due process of law.90
Thus the High Court has been prepared to make implications from
the text of the Constitution, and several members of the Court have
suggested that the Constitution might require due process and/or a
right to a fair trial. These rights are of ancient origin and have been
recognized in other jurisdictions. Due process then might include:
The right to trial by jury for serious offences, the right to unanimous
jury verdict, the right to due process/procedural fairness (including
natural justice), right to legal representation in criminal matters, right
86 See Wheeler, above n. 80 at 272: ‘it should be accepted that where Parliament has
placed upon the defendant the persuasive burden of proof in relation to an
element of a federal offence, this is (prima facie) to ask a court exercising federal
jurisdiction to conduct an unfair criminal trial because of the risk that under such
circumstances a defendant will be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable
doubt as to his or her guilt’.
87 In Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR
477 at 501 (Mason CJ and Toohey J), 527 (Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ) and
550 (McHugh J) the presumption of innocence was described as a fundamental
principle of the common law and fundamental to our system of criminal justice,
and in the same case Mason CJ and Toohey J (503–4), Brennan J (512), and Deane,
Dawson and Gaudron JJ (533–4) confirmed that the right to silence was a basic
and substantive common law right. Such rights have also been confirmed as part
of ‘due process’ in the United States: Malloy v Hogan (1964) 378 US 1.
88 For example, double jeopardy (Benton v Maryland) (1969) 395 US 784; just
compensation (Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Co v Chicago) (1897) 166
US 226; speedy trial (Klopfer v North Carolina) (1967) 386 US 213; public trial and
notice of charges (In Re Oliver) (1948) 333 US 257; impartial jury (Irvin v Dowd)
(1961) 366 US 717; jury trial (Duncan v Louisiana) (1968) 391 US 145; confrontation
(Pointer v Texas) (1965) 380 US 400; right to legal representation (Gideon v
Wainwright) (1963) 372 US 335; cruel and unusual punishment (Robinson v
California) (1962) 370 US 660.
89 Myers v United States (1926) 272 US 52 at 293; as Rostow observed, ‘the
separation of powers under the Constitution serves the end of democracy in
society by limiting the roles of the several branches of government and protecting
the citizen, and the various parts of the state itself, against encroachments from
any source. The root idea of the Constitution is that man can be free because the
state is not’: Eugene Rostow, ‘The Democratic Character of Judicial Review’ (1952)
66 Harvard Law Review 193 at 195.
90 Steve Sheppard, Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke, vol. 2 (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 2003) 858; James Stoner Jr, ‘Natural Law, Common Law and the
Constitution’ in Douglas Edlin (ed.), Common Law Theory (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 2007) 176.
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to presumption of innocence, right to silence, the right to vote, right to
judicial review, freedom from arbitrary punishment, incarceration in
prison only for past breach of the criminal law.
It will be seen that many of these rights can be deduced from the right
to due process/right to a fair trial which some members of the High
Court have been prepared to recognize. This can be drawn from the
separation of powers the Constitution clearly expressly contemplates.
Other possible implied rights include the right to freedom of thought/
conscience/religion, considered implicit in the representative demo-
cracy contemplated by the Constitution.
Of course, many of these rights find written expression in human
rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.91 Though the use of international materials
to interpret the Constitution or the common law is of course con-
tentious, at least some members of the High Court have used inter-
national materials as evidence of the common law92 or to guide
constitutional questions.93
This theory does mean the judges would have a role to play in
giving precise meaning to these rights, and reviewing legislation to
see whether it is consistent with these stated rights. It is suggested
that, as with rights expressed in legal documents, the rights not be
considered absolute, and that some kind of ‘reasonable regulation’
exception would operate, much as it does in respect of the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech in the United States. The
judges would modify and adapt the precise content of these rights
over time as society developed and changed, just as the common law
has always adapted.
ii. Philosophical Support
(a) Links with Social Contract Theory and Sovereignty
Leading advocates of social contract theory had views on the extent to
which rights of an individual were subsumed by the ‘contract’ they
entered into with others to form a civilized society.94 Locke, for
example, states clearly that there are limits of the authority of the
91 Universal Declaration (1948) Articles 1–21.
92 For example, Kirby J in Al Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 at 624 noted the
‘profound influence on the most basic statements of international law (and
specifically of the law of human rights and fundamental freedoms) of Anglo-
Australian lawyers and the concepts they derived from the common law’.
93 One recent example is Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 at 179
(Gleeson CJ) and 203–4 (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ).
94 Rousseau, for example, believed that there were natural rights which lawmakers
could not rescind: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1920).
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body delegated to make laws.95 He claims that their powers are
limited by natural rights,96 he believed that an individual only entered
into the social contract in order to preserve their liberties.97 Locke
believed that the purpose of government was to ensure the ‘mutual
preservation of human lives, liberties and estates, and more generally
decries the idea that the legislators have absolute power.98 As Allan
says, ‘in political theory, the legislative power derives from the con-
sent of the people and is to be understood as a trust for their
benefit’.99
Several members of the High Court have accepted the argument
that sovereignty lies in the Australian people,100 including Mason CJ,
Deane J, Toohey J101 and McHugh J.102 Mason CJ’s conclusion was
clear, remarking that the Australia Act recognized that ‘ultimate
sovereignty resided in the Australian people’.103 Clearly embracing
Lockean theory, Deane and Toohey JJ expressed their views in terms
of the original agreement of the people and subsequent maintenance
and acquiescence of its provisions. They concluded that all powers of
government ultimately belonged to, and were derived from, the gov-
erned.104 Justice Toohey elaborated on these views extra-judicially:
95 A practical example is found in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen (1789, France): ‘Men are born and remain free and equal in rights . . . The
aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man’.
96 ‘the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as
others’: John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co Ltd, 1689) Chapter 11 Of the Extent of the Legislative Power,
para. 135. In this way, the views of natural lawyer Finnis are similar—Finnis
describes as a ‘principal component of the idea of constitutional government . . .
the holding of the rulers to their side of a relationship of reciprocity, in which the
claims of authority are respected on condition that authority respects the claims
of the common good’: Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 1980) 272–3.
97 Locke, above n. 96 at paras 123–30.
98 Ibid., Chapter 7 Of Political and Civil Society, para. 93: ‘As if when Men quitting
the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one,
should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty
of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity.
This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what
Mischielfs [sic] may be done them, by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay
think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions.’
99 Trevor Allan, ‘Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and
Constitutionalism’ (1985) 44 Cambridge Law Journal 111 at 129.
100 This notion is also at the heart of the United States Constitution: Alexis de
Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Dearborn: New York, 1835) ch. 3.
101 Nationwide News v Willis (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 72.
102 McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 230.
103 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 138.
See also McHugh J in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 230 who
declared that the political and legal sovereignty of Australia now resided in the
Australian people.
104 Nationwide News v Willis (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 72; Theophanous v Herald and
Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 171 and 180. 
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Where the people of Australia, in adopting a constitution, conferred
power to legislate with respect to various subject matters upon a Com-
monwealth Parliament, it is to be presumed that they did not intend that
those grants of power extend to invasion of fundamental common law
liberties.105
Similar views had in a different era been expressed by Murphy J,106
and by Inglis Clark back in 1901.107 The implication of the suggestion
that sovereignty lies in the people is that Parliament does not have the
power to infringe common law rights and liberties of the sovereign
body.108 It would also reduce the importance of the intentions of the
founding fathers in relation to the protection of rights.109
Allan relates Lockean theory with the rule of law:
The rule of law constitutes an ideal of consent, wherein the law seeks the
citizen’s acceptance of its demands as morally justified: he is invited to
acknowledge that obedience is the appropriate response in the light of
his obligation to further the legitimate needs of the common good . . . If
the law aspires to an order of governance that all can freely accept, as a
necessary framework for the co-operation of autonomous and morally
conscientious citizens, there are certain basic freedoms and other in-
stitutional arrangements whose constitutional status must be placed be-
yond serious constitutional challenge . . . If the rule of law attributes
responsibility for the identification of ‘valid’ law . . . to the conscience of
the individual citizen, acting on his understanding of the needs of the
common good, purported ‘laws’ or policies that are gravely unjust . . .
lack both legal and moral authority.110
105 Toohey, above n. 54 at 170.
106 Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1) (1985) 159 CLR 351 at 383 (see also
Deane J, 442).
107 Inglis Clark, Studies in Constitutional Law (Law Booksellers: Melbourne, 1901)
21–2, where he claimed the sovereign was the body with the power to maintain
and alter the Constitution, i.e. the people. See John Williams, ‘“With Eyes Wide
Open”: Andrew Inglis Clark and Our Republican Tradition’ (1995) 23 Federal Law
Review 149.
108 See, for example, Harley G.A. Wright, ‘Sovereignty of the People—The New
Constitutional Grundnorm’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 165; George Winterton,
‘Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review
1; Andrew Fraser, ‘False Hopes: Implied Rights and Popular Sovereignty in the
Australian Constitution’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 213. Writing extra-
judicially, Michael Kirby was prepared to consider the possibility that ‘in certain
truly extreme cases, it might be arguable that a purported enactment was not a
“law” of the kind envisaged by the Australian Constitution. Such an approach
might follow from the recognition of the fact that the foundation of Australia’s
Constitution lies in the will of the Australian people’: Deep Lying Rights—A
Constitutional Conversation Continues, The Robin Cooke Lecture 2004, p. 7. Kirby
accepted that sovereignty lay with the people rather than the Parliament (12), and
concluded that legislators were ‘subject to the overriding requirements of human
rights and fundamental freedoms’ (13).
109 Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 127–8, noting
that the founding fathers were not the source of legitimacy of the Constitution,
rather living Australian citizens were.
110 Allan, above n. 25 at 6–7.
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(b) The Rule of Law and Rights
Dicey’s counterbalance to the absolutism involved in his doctrine of
Parliamentary supremacy was the rule of law. He took the rule of law
to imply that no person could be punished except for a distinct breach
of law established in ordinary manner before the courts (i.e. no arbit-
rary exercise of power), that all were equal before the law, and that
civil liberties were the result of past case law rather than formal
constitutional recognition.111
At one point he seemed to have a broad view of the consequences
of the rule of law—stating that freedom from arbitrary arrest, the
right to express opinions, and the right to property were all part of
the ‘law of the land’. He then said:
[W]here . . . the right to individual freedom is part of the constitution
because it is inherent in the ordinary law of the land, the right is one
which can hardly be destroyed without a thorough revolution in the
institutions and manners of the nation . . . the constitution being based
on the rule of law, the suspension of the constitution, as far as such a
thing can be conceived possible, would mean with us nothing less than
a revolution.112
However, in the end he re-asserts the dominance of Parliamentary
supremacy.
Others have pointed out what they see as the conflict between the
absolutism involved in Parliamentary supremacy and the rule of
law.113 Wait sees it thus:
The limits supplied by the common law in the Communist Party Case
were analogous to the notions of natural law so famously drawn upon
by Sir Edward Coke. Dixon’s commitment to fundamental common law
principles demonstrated a re-alignment of Dicey’s two pre-eminent
111 Dicey, above n. 22 at 183–91.
112 Ibid. at 196–7. On the same page he contrasted systems where the right to
individual freedom is a result deduced from the principles of the Constitution; the
right could be readily taken away or suspended. However, in England, because
the right to individual freedom was part of the Constitution as being inherent in
the law of the land, the right was one that could not be destroyed without a
revolution. However, with respect he then contradicts himself (in my view)
because he acknowledges that the English Habeas Corpus Act could be
suspended and the English would enjoy ‘almost all the rights of citizens’. He had
on the same page said that the rights of English people could not be destroyed
without a revolution, and contrasted England with other countries where
constitutional rights could be suspended. He concedes that Parliamentary
supremacy and the rule of law might appear to be contradictory—his way of
reconciling them was in effect to assert the superiority of Parliamentary
supremacy, but acknowledge the role of courts in interpreting such legislation
consistently with the rule of law (409). In practice, this reconciliation might occur,
for example, by courts presuming that statutes do not undermine common law
rights, or, where there is ambiguity, reading the Act narrowly to minimize its
impact on fundamental rights.
113 Geoffrey de Walker, ‘Dicey’s Dubious Dogma of Parliamentary Sovereignty: A
Recent Fray with Freedom of Religion’ (1985) 59 Australian Law Journal 276 at
281.
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constitutional principles, installing the rule of law over the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty.114
Both Sir Owen Dixon and Victor Windeyer have in extra-judicial writ-
ing confirmed that the rule of law forms part of the common law
which underlies Australia’s constitutional arrangements and which
informs our understanding of the Constitution in Australia.115 The
International Commission of Jurists and the Chicago Colloquium on
the Rule of Law have argued that the rule of law requires legislative
power to be subject to certain limits, whether by constitutional limit
or by custom.116
An important aspect of the rule of law is that individuals are ex-
pected to know in advance what the nature of official encroachment
on their liberties is to be before that power is exercised against the
individual.117 It may be argued that the Australian people were not
informed in the lead up to the referendum to adopt the Constitution
that the new Commonwealth Parliament, or the new state Parliaments
that owe their existence to the Constitution, would have the right to
alter fundamental rights and liberties that they enjoyed at that time,
including the right to trial by jury and other rights in relation to
criminal matters. They did not consent to such rights being taken
away, and they assumed that the rights they enjoyed as citizens up
until that time would continue to be enjoyed post-federation. They
had no reason to think otherwise.
As a result, the principle of the rule of law could be used to justify
limits on the ability of Parliament to pass legislation interfering with
fundamental common law rights and liberties. Aristotle remarked that
a characteristic of humans was that they shared a sense of the just and
the unjust, and that their sharing of a common understanding of
justice made a polis.118 In discussing these comments, Rawls adds that
a ‘common understanding of justice as fairness makes a constitutional
democracy’.119 He adds that:
We are not required to acquiesce in the denial of our own and others’
basic liberties, since this requirement could not have been within the
114 See Wait, above n. 55 at 68.
115 See Dixon, Jesting Pilate, above n. 55 at 199 (similar comments appear in his
decision in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193);
Windeyer, above n. 60. In Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337,
Gummow and Hayne JJ said that the occasion had yet to arise for consideration
of all that may follow from Dixon’s sentiments (381).
116 International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in a Free Society (1960) 198
at 210–15; Les Colloques de Chicago (1959) 9 Annales de la Faculté de Droit
d’Istanbul 58.
117 See Allan, above n. 99 at 117.
118 Politics, bk I, ch. II, 1253a15.
119 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1971) 243.
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meaning of the duty of justice in the original position, nor consistent
with the understanding of the rights of the majority in the constitutional
convention120 . . . a just constitution is defined as a constitution that
would be agreed upon by rational delegates in a constitutional conven-
tion who are guided by the [principle] that each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a system of liberty for all.121
There is no evidence the author has read to suggest that the founding
fathers were aware that, or intended that, these Parliaments would (or
had the right to) take away fundamental common law liberties. It was
not, as I have indicated earlier, their experience that colonial Parlia-
ments had interfered with common law liberties and freedoms, and
they could not have anticipated that this would occur.122
Another way in which the rule of law may be relevant here is to see
the concept as a counterbalance of Dicey’s other doctrine of Parlia-
mentary supremacy. In other words, Parliamentary supremacy does
not allow infringements of the rule of law. Allan, for example, dis-
cusses different conceptions of the rule of law, including formal equal-
ity, or the sense that legal rules are applied strictly to everyone
according to their tenor, and substantive equality. In favouring sub-
stantive equality, Allan was able to suggest that the rule of law
requires equality of treatment of individuals, or due process,123 to be
followed. He concluded that the rule of law was to be preserved by
construing statutes consistently with fundamental principles of justice
embedded in the common law,124 and he singled out freedom of
thought, speech, conscience and association as examples of non-
negotiable constituents of an enduring common good.125 Rawls
agreed that the rule of law required due process.126
This view obtains support from some members of the judiciary, for
example Lord Woolf MR, who found that ‘ultimately there are even
limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is the courts’ inalien-
able responsibility to identify and uphold . . . They are no more than
are necessary to enable the rule of law to be preserved’,127 and recent
120 Ibid. at 355.
121 Ibid. at 355, 250 (Rawls discussed a second principle of justice: that liberty could
only be restricted for the sake of liberty).
122 Gleeson CJ in Roche v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 noted in
respect of the founding fathers that ‘the history of their country had not taught
them the need of provisions directed to the control of the legislature itself’ (172).
123 He suggests they are ‘two faces of the same coin’: Allan, above n. 110 at 251.
124 Ibid. at 20.
125 p. 23.
126 See Rawls, above n. 119 at 239.
127 Lord Woolf, ‘Droit Public—English Style’ [1995] Public Law 57 at 68–9; John Laws,
‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] Public Law 72 at 81; Lord Denning, ‘Misuse of Power’
(1981) 55 Australian Law Journal 720 at 723.
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comments in the House of Lords in R (Jackson) v Attorney-General128
where Lords Steyn129 and Hope,130 in obiter comments, denied that
Parliamentary sovereignty was absolute. Lord Hope expressly re-
ferred, in agreeing with Sir Owen Dixon, to the ‘supremacy through-
out the constitution of ordinary law’.
Of course, much will depend on how the rule of law is defined, and
if all that is meant is that legislative power is subject to constitutional
limit, as the International Commission suggests, there is no difficulty
and it supports the idea of restraint of the absolutism otherwise im-
plied by Parliamentary supremacy.
However, is what is meant by the rule of law that there be ‘equality’
as Allan suggests? Is that concept the needed brake on the ability of
Parliament to pass legislation? For example, take a law that abolishes
jury trials for all of those accused of crimes. Now, this law would
apply equally to all accused. Would this pass Allan’s ‘equality’ test and
so not infringe the rule of law? What of a law that reversed the
presumption of innocence, or abolished the right to silence in all
criminal trials? Again, these laws on their face and in effect would
apply in a non-discriminatory way, so it may be that they would pass
the ‘equality’ test and so not be struck out by the rule of law. However,
to the author such laws would be repugnant to fundamental common
law rights. To the extent that the ‘equality’ test would validate such
laws, the author does not find the test convincing.131
The conception of the rule of law discussed earlier in this part is
preferred, that all individuals must know in advance the nature of the
encroachment on their liberties, and that the Australian people in the
lead up to the adoption of the Constitution were not advised, and did
not expect, that the powers of the new Commonwealth governments
128 [2006] 1 AC 262.
129 Ibid. at 302: ‘We do not in the United Kingdom have an uncontrolled constitution
as the Attorney-General implausibly asserts . . . The classic account given by
Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it was,
can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom. Nevertheless,
the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. It is a
construct of the common law. The judges created this principle. If that is so, it is
not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts have to qualify a
principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism. In exceptional
circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role
of the courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new Supreme
Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which
even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a complaisant House of
Commons cannot abolish.’
130 Ibid. at 303–4: ‘Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute . . .
Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative
sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being
qualified.’
131 I would agree with the observation of Rawls then that ‘treating similar cases
similarly is not a sufficient guarantee of substantive justice’: Rawls, above n. 119
at 59.
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and state governments would extend to the extinguishment of funda-
mental common law rights.
iii. Governments do Take Away Fundamental Rights and Liberties
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.132
At the heart of Diceyan theory is the notion that the remedy for
government law invading fundamental human rights is political only,
rather than legal. The courts are apparently impotent in the face of
repugnant laws. Dicey used the well-known example of the blue-eyed
baby to demonstrate his absolutist position:
If a legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the
preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal; but legislators must
go mad before they could pass such a law, and the subjects be idiotic
before they could submit to it.133
While there is some abstract logic in Dicey’s model in terms of self-
preservation,134 the reality must be accepted that governments do,
and have, legislated to take away fundamental common law liberties.
Dixon J in the Communist Party Case recognized this:
History . . . shows that in countries where democratic institutions have
been unconstitutionally superseded, it has been done not seldom by
those holding the executive power.135
The right to trial by jury has been greatly restricted; the right to
silence has in some cases been curtailed. The right of accused to
cross-examine witnesses testifying against them has been limited in
some cases.136 Legislation has been passed providing for systems of
preventive detention;137 control orders have been introduced in the
terrorist context;138 legislation providing for indefinite detention
based only on Ministerial direction has been validated.139 Laws have
been passed to greatly restrict the right of refugees to claim judicial
review in relation to their refugee applications.140 It was sought to
introduce legislation to ban a political party in Australia, infringing
the fundamental right of freedom of association.141 When that legisla-
tion was struck down, the government sought to introduce a refer-
endum to give it the power to directly deal with the Communist Party.
132 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, Lowell Lecture, 23 November 1880. 
133 Dicey, above n. 22 at 79.
134 Ibid.: ‘the permanent wishes of the representative portion of Parliament can
hardly in the long run differ from the wishes of the English people’ (81).
135 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 187–8.
136 National Security Information Act 2004 (Cth).
137 Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575.
138 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307.
139 Lloyd v Wallach (1915) 20 CLR 299.
140 Emma Larking, ‘Human Rights and the Principle of Sovereignty: A Dangerous
Conflict at the Heart of the Nation State?’ (2004) Australian Journal of Human
Rights 15; refer for further discussion to Alice Edwards, ‘Tampering With Refugee
Protection: The Case of Australia’ (2003) 15(2) International Journal of Refugee
Law 192.
141 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.
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Though the referendum was defeated, the government who had intro-
duced the original legislation, and who subsequently pressed the
issue at a referendum, was not removed from office by the people
when given an opportunity. The attempted invasion of human rights
was not ‘remedied’ by the political process, as Dicey would have
believed. Of course, the truth is far more complex—people make their
decision as to their government based on a range of factors. Anec-
dotally, it is suggested that the human rights record of a government
would be well down the list of factors influencing election outcomes,
and there is evidence that governments which pass laws invasive of
human rights actually enjoy a payoff at the polls.142
This is not to argue the relative merits of any or all of the above
policy decisions. It is to affirm that history is replete with examples
where governments have sought to take away fundamental civil liber-
ties. There is an inherent tension between the exercise of legislative
power and the preservation of civil liberties, to make it incoherent to
expect the holders of the former to always respect the latter.
One can make the same point in reverse—that there are numerous
examples where it has been the courts, rather than Parliaments, that
have remedied what we now consider to be gross breaches of human
rights. It was the High Court of Australia, rather than the Parliament,
that took the first steps to the recognition of indigenous land rights in
this country.143 It was the United States Supreme Court that took the
decision that eventually ended government policies favouring segre-
gation based on race.144 It was that court that set out minimum re-
quirements for the questioning of suspects.145
Of course, this isn’t meant to imply that the common law is perfect.
Justice Gummow has commented that it would be unwise to ‘carry
into constitutional discourse an undue romanticism about the com-
mon law’.146 So much may be agreed. However, the above examples
show that any romanticism about the role of Parliament in preserving
fundamental civil liberties is also misplaced.
V. Counter-Arguments
i. Parliamentary Supremacy
It is sometimes said that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 heralded an
acceptance of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, in other
142 Many argue, for example, that one of the main reasons the Howard Government
won re-election at the 2001 election, despite trailing at the polls for much of its
second term, was the tough approach they took to the question of ‘boat people’.
143 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
144 Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483—of course, in the context of a
written Bill of Rights.
145 Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436—again with an express Bill of Rights.
146 See Gummow, above n. 67 at 176. He states that much legislative activity has been
expended in varying or abrogating distasteful aspects of common law doctrine.
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words, that Parliament could make or unmake any law, and it was not
for a court to declare laws to be invalid.147 The view would be that
Coke’s doctrines could not have survived this development, despite
what Blackstone wrote above post-Revolution. An absolutist version
of Parliamentary supremacy would logically not support the implica-
tion of rights from the text of the Constitution and/or the common
law, since this would have the effect of reducing the power of Parlia-
ment to pass laws it deems fit.
However, others have since challenged the view that the events of
1688 established Parliamentary supremacy.148 Marshall, for example,
argued that the Revolution simply meant Parliament was supreme
relative to other organs of government, rather than that it was
omnicompetent;149 Allott claimed Dicey’s views flew in the face of
1000 years of talk of ‘fundamental law’ by kings and others;150 and de
Walker claimed conflict between the Diceyan theory of Parliamentary
supremacy and the rule of law.151 Fitzgerald spoke of the ‘ignorant
trust’ Dicey reposed in the Parliament.152 The doctrine of Parliament-
ary supremacy may be simply a common law rule, subject to change
like every other principle of common law.153 A provision of the (Eng-
lish) Bill of Rights might also deny the plausibility of Parliamentary
147 See Dicey, above n. 22 at 38; Goldsworthy, above n. 10, says that Parliamentary
supremacy was only accepted as a maxim in the nineteenth century (164); cf.
Maitland, who argues that Parliamentary supremacy was established by the reign
of Elizabeth I: Frederic Maitland, The Constitutional History of England
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1908) 254–5, 298, 301.
148 ‘The revolution of 1688 did not assert the supremacy of Parliament’:
R.A. Edwards, ‘Dr Bonham’s Case: The Ghost in the Constitutional Machine’
[1996] Denning LJ 63 at 69.
149 Geoffrey Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth (Clarendon
Press: Oxford, 1957) ch. 5; Sir Matthew Hale also rejected a suggestion that
Parliament had unlimited powers (Hale’s Reflections by the Lrd. Chiefe Justice
Hale on Mr Hobbes his Dialogue of the Law) referred to in de Walker, above n. 113
at 278. Walker claims Dicey’s theory lacked judicial precedent.
150 Philip Allott, ‘The Courts and Parliament: Who Whom?’ (1979) 38 Cambridge Law
Journal 79 at 114.
151 See de Walker, above n. 113 at 281. Wait concludes that Parliamentary
sovereignty (as he calls it, rather than supremacy) is ‘an affront to the rule of our
law and has no place in our Constitution at all’: Wait, above n. 55 at 73.
152 Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Proportionality and Australian Constitutionalism’ (1993) 12
University of Tasmania Law Review 263 at 265.
153 Trevor Allan, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics, and Revolution’ (1997) 113
Law Quarterly Review 443 at 445; Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 2003) 103. Sir Owen Dixon claimed the common law contained no
general doctrine in favour of Parliamentary supremacy; it applied only to the
United Kingdom Parliament: Jesting Pilate, above n. 55 at 200. Even to that extent,
it has had to be re-formulated, as Allan argues, in the context of British
membership of the European Union (447), as Vick also notes: Douglas Vick, ‘The
Human Rights Act and the British Constitution’ (2002) 37 Texas International Law
Journal 329 at 349. Sir Owen Dixon also described Parliamentary supremacy as a
doctrine of English common law: Jesting Pilate, above n. 55 at 199. Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, a leading advocate of Parliamentary supremacy in Australia,
concedes that it depends on judicial acceptance: ‘The Myth of the Common Law
Constitution’ in Douglas Edlin (ed.), Common Law Theory (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 2007) 235.
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supremacy—after enumerating various rights, Article VI of the Bill
states that:
All and singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in the said
declaration, are the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of
the people of this kingdom, and that all . . . shall be firmly and strictly
holden and observed.154
Despite the dominance of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy in
England, there are clear examples, for example in the context of the
recognition of foreign law, where the courts have recognized limits.
For example, the House of Lords refers to a foreign law as involving
‘so grave an infringement of human rights that the courts of this
country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all’.155 This leaves
open the question of the attitude of the court if the law were instead a
local one. In the case of a British statute which declared that the
findings of a Commission were not to be called into question in any
court of law, the British court ignored the provision. Lord Reid, for
example, said that he ‘expected to find something more specific than
the bald statement that the determination shall not be called into
question in any court of law’.156 The notion of Parliamentary suprem-
acy does and has changed, in light of the evolution of the European
Union.157
The notion of Parliamentary supremacy is more difficult in a coun-
try such as Australia that accepts judicial review of the constitution-
ality of legislation, and the ability of a court to strike down legislation
inconsistent with the Constitution.158 The notion may be at odds with
a federal state,159 and Dicey himself would not have found the Austra-
lian Parliament to be a sovereign law-making body, according to his
154 Article VI, English Bill of Rights (1689).
155 Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249 at 278, HL; a more recent example is
Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company [2002] UKHL 19.
156 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. Equivalent
examples in Australia arguably include Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration,
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 where a majority
invalidated a provision stating that ‘a court is not to order the release from
custody of a designated person’: Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ;
Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ dissenting. In Plaintiff S157/2002 v
Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 the High Court greatly restricted the ambit of
a provision of the Migration Act denying the court the ability to hear argument
‘calling into question’ a privative clause decision. The court found that the
provision did not apply to decisions affected by jurisdictional error—these were
not decisions but ‘purported decisions’. This ruling had the effect that the
administrative law grounds of review of a decision under the Act were preserved,
despite what appears to be a clear Parliamentary attempt to do otherwise.
157 Julie Debeljak, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): The Preservation of
Parliamentary Supremacy in the Context of Rights Protection’ (2003) Australian
Journal of Human Rights 10; Allan, above n. 153; Sir William Wade,
‘Sovereignty—Revolution or Evolution?’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 568.
158 Goldsworthy claims the doctrine exists in Australia, albeit in a ‘heavily modified
form’: above n. 10 at 279.
159 See Wait, above n. 55 at 60; Smallbone, above n. 6 at 258. In discussing another
federal system, the United States, Dicey spoke of sovereignty as existing in the
Supreme Court: above n. 22 at 170.
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criteria.160 Speaking of the United States Supreme Court, but in terms
equally applicable to the High Court of Australia, Dicey observed
that:
Sovereignty is lodged in a body which rarely exerts its authority and has
(so to speak) only a potential existence; no legislature throughout the
land is more than a subordinate law-making body capable in strictness
of enacting nothing but by-laws; the powers of the executive are again
limited by the constitution; the interpreters of the constitution are the
judges. The Bench therefore can and must determine the limits to the
authority both of the government and of the legislature; its decision is
without appeal; the consequence follows that the Bench of judges is not
only the guardian but also at a given moment the master of the
Constitution.161
Sir Owen Dixon said it was not a doctrine of general application to all
legislatures, and its effect was confined to the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment.162 A unanimous High Court agreed in Lange v Australian Broad-
casting Corporation that: ‘The Constitution displaced, or rendered
inapplicable, the English common law doctrine of the general com-
petence and unqualified supremacy of the legislature.’163
Further, we recognize the ability of Commonwealth and state
Parliaments to enact manner and form provisions, a phenomenon
clearly at odds with the Diceyan notion of Parliamentary suprem-
acy.164 It is also now difficult given political and legal change in the
United Kingdom, alluded to recently by Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of
the House of Lords.165
160 He gave three characteristics of a sovereign law-making body: (a) there is no law
which Parliament cannot change; (b) there is no distinction between laws which
are not fundamental or constitutional and laws which are fundamental or
constitutional; and (c) there is no body which can pronounce void any enactment
passed by the British Parliament on the ground that the enactment is contrary to
the Constitution (84–7). In Australia, Parliament cannot change the Constitution.
There is a distinction between constitutional laws and other laws, and the High
Court of Australia does judge the compatibility of laws with the Constitution.
161 See Dicey, above n. 22 at 170–1.
162 Jesting Pilate, above n. 55 at 200; cf. Gleeson CJ in Roach v Electoral
Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 at 172 who noted that the founding fathers
admired, respected and largely adopted Parliamentary supremacy (172–3).
163 (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 564 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh,
Gummow and Kirby JJ).
164 ‘A truly supreme and sovereign parliament would be able to make any law,
including a law that binds future parliaments, without the judiciary being able to
strike it down. If parliament is bound by the laws of its predecessor, it is not
supreme or sovereign in this sense’: Julie Taylor, ‘Human Rights Protection in
Australia: Interpretation Provisions and Parliamentary Supremacy’ (2004) 32
Federal Law Review 57 at 61.
165 ‘The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of
Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the
modern United Kingdom’: R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2006] 1 AC 262 at 302
(Lord Steyn) and 303 (Lord Hope). In MacCormick v Advocate General, Lord
Cooper suggested (dicta) that Parliamentary sovereignty was a rule of English
constitutional law that might not have survived the creation of the Great Britain
Parliament in 1707: [1953] SC 396 at 411–12; Thomas Smith, ‘The Union of 1707 as
Fundamental Law’ [1957] Public Law 99; Neil MacCormick, ‘Does the United
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It may be that, as Allan has advocated, the doctrine should not be
seen in isolation but associated with the rule of law, and not superior
to it. Legislation inconsistent with the rule of law (as defined) is not
valid, despite Parliamentary supremacy. He said:
The fundamental constraints of equality and due process are wrongly
viewed as limitations on popular sovereignty. That is a false antithesis,
which lends spurious plausibility to the notion of conflicting imperatives
of ‘popular sovereignty’ and ‘judicial activism’. The critical question is
how the idea of popular sovereignty should be understood: in what
sense is the constitution owned or fashioned by the people, and what is
the basis of their loyalty to its commands? Democracy is an aspiration to
self-government that is erroneously equated with majority rule; and the
corresponding idea of popular sovereignty should be understood to
embody the claim of every citizen to equal respect. A majority decision
to remove the legal foundations of the dignity and independence of a
single citizen, in violation of the principles of the rule of law, is not to be
understood as an exercise of popular sovereignty, however great the
majority or passionate its specious claim of legitimacy. Citizenship in a
liberal democratic regime cannot be equated merely with liberty to vote,
on the one hand, and subjection to whatever treatment a majority vote
endorses, on the other.166
It was discussed in the section prior to this one that despite the faith
that Diceyan Parliamentary supremacy places in the political process,
there are numerous examples where Parliaments have acted to seri-
ously erode rights. The remedy in respect of such laws is not always
or often in fact at the ballot box.
For these reasons, it must be questioned whether it is correct any
more to apply notions of Parliamentary supremacy to the constitu-
tional arrangements of Australia. It has powerful detractors, most
prominently a unanimous High Court in Lange. As a result, notions of
Parliamentary supremacy should not be used to argue against the
implication of rights in the Constitution.
Kingdom have a Constitution? Reflections on MacCormick v Lord Advocate’
(1978) 29 Northern Ireland Quarterly 1. See also R v Secretary of State for
Transport, ex parte Factortame [1991] 1 AC 603, HL; John Eekelaar, ‘The Death of
Parliamentary Sovereignty—A Comment’ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 185;
Allan, above n. 153; Sir William Wade, ‘What Has Happened to the Sovereignty of
Parliament?’ (1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 1. It has sometimes been suggested
that the ultra vires doctrine of administrative law proves that the common law
retains supremacy over Parliament: see, for example, C.F. Forsyth, ‘Of Fig Leaves
and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and
Judicial Review’ (1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 122; Paul Craig, ‘Ultra Vires
and the Foundations of Judicial Review’ (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal 63;
Mark Elliott, ‘The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central
Principle of Administrative Law’ (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 129; and M.
Elliott, ‘The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty? The Implications for Justifying
Judicial Review’ (1999) 115 Law Quarterly Review 119.
166 See Allan, above n. 110 at 261–2.
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ii. Arguments About Democracy
Judicial review of the validity of legislation is not an essential pre-
requisite for the protection of human rights and democracy in every
legal system committed to those ideals.167
It is often argued by advocates of Parliamentary supremacy that the
alternative, which would give judges a role in reviewing legislation
and invalidating statutes which impinged on fundamental legal rights,
is anti-democratic. Typically, Ekins states that:
The obvious, and to my mind irrefutable, objection to judicial supremacy
is that elected legislators have a far greater democratic mandate than
unelected judges to make the political choices that determine the con-
tent of the law, especially in respect of morally controversial issues . . . it
is implausible to assert that judges will necessarily make morally sound
decisions.168
However, with respect it may be mistaken to equate ‘democracy’ with
majoritarian will, as the above quote implies.169 Sir Anthony Mason
concluded that ‘our evolving concept of the democratic process is
moving beyond an exclusive emphasis on parliamentary supremacy
and majority will . . . embracing a notion of responsible government
which respects the fundamental rights and dignity of the indi-
vidual’.170 Similarly, Allan spoke of ‘an appropriately sophisticated
conception of democracy . . . likely to recognize the existence of cer-
tain basic individual rights, whose importance to the fundamental
167 See Goldsworthy, above n. 10 at 279.
168 Richard Ekins, ‘Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly
Review 127; James Allan, ‘A Defence of the Status Quo’ in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey
Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Human Rights (Oxford
University Press: New York, 2003); Jeremy Waldron, ‘Moral Truth and Judicial
Review’ (1998) 43 American Journal of Jurisprudence 75 at 92; Law and
Disagreement (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1999); Goldsworthy, above n. 10 at 257.
Albert Dicey stated that ‘the wishes of the representative portion of Parliament
can hardly in the long run differ from the wishes of the English people’: Dicey,
above n. 22 at 81.
169 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in
Court’ (1990) 28 Alberta Law Review 324 at 337. It seems Plato and Aristotle also
had a more sophisticated sense of democracy—‘societies in which the winners of
the competition for office reserve the conduct of public affairs wholly to
themselves are no constitutional states, just as enactments, so far as they are not
for the common interest of the whole community, are no true laws’ (Laws IV:
715b) (Plato), and Aristotle: ‘it would seem to be a reasonable criticism to say that
such a rule-of-the-many is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not
govern there is no constitution . . . an organisation of this kind, in which all things
are administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not even a democracy in the
proper sense’ (Politics III, 4:1279a17–22; 5:1280b7–9; IV, 4:1292a31–4). Citing these
passages, Finnis argues that these writers believed that unjust laws were not
laws: Finnis, above n. 96 at 363 (despite having been passed by a ‘Parliament’).
170 ‘Future Directions in Australian Law’ (1987) 13 Monash University Law Review 149
at 163; and ‘The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation’ (1986) 16 Federal
Law Review 1.
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idea of citizenship in a free society . . . will properly place them be-
yond serious legislative encroachment’.171 It is an error to argue that a
society is not democratic unless it has a government of unlimited
powers.172
Further, while Ekins may be right that there is no guarantee that
judges will necessarily make morally sound decisions, it is suggested
that legislators are likely to feel more pressure to encroach on funda-
mental civil liberties than are judges.173 Parliamentarians are under
pressure to react to some perceived wrong or injustice. They are
influenced by lobby groups to act in particular ways that may not
respect fundamental human rights.174 The ability of a legislator to
impinge on fundamental civil liberties, through the passage of legisla-
tion that applies to every member of society, is far greater than the
ability of a judge to impinge on fundamental liberties. Even the frail
shield of accountability to the people fails when those affected are in a
minority or for some other reason are not represented in the legis-
lature.175 So while I agree that neither judges nor legislators have all
of the ‘morally sound’ cards, it is submitted that the likelihood of an
171 See Allan, above n. 153 at 449; ‘The Common Law as Public Reason’ in Edlin (ed.),
above n. 153 at 196. In New Zealand, Sir Robin Cooke accepted the proposition
that legislative powers were subject to the common law: see, for example, L v M
[1979] 2 NZLR 519 at 527; Brader v Ministry of Transport [1981] 1 NZLR 73 at 78;
New Zealand Drivers’ Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] 1 NZLR 374
at 390; Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116 at 121; Taylor v New
Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398; ‘Fundamentals’ [1988] New
Zealand Law Journal 158; Karen Grau, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty: New
Zealand—New Millennium’ (2002) 33 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review
351; Kirby, above n. 108.
172 See Rostow, above n. 89 at 199; B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
(Yale University Press: London, 1921).
173 Rostow puts it in a different way but essentially makes a similar point: ‘It is hardly
characteristic of law in democratic society to encourage bills of attainder, or to
allow appeals from the courts in particular cases to legislatures or to mobs’:
Rostow, above n. 89 at 197.
174 Judge Learned Hand noted that the founding fathers had put the adjudicators of
the Constitution ‘deliberately . . . beyond the reach of popular pressure’: The
Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilisation, address on the 250th
anniversary of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (1942). It seems
strange then to accuse a court making decisions about rights of being anti-
democratic when the very fact that is not directly accountable to the people
arguably puts it in the ideal position to make judgments about rights
dispassionately and in a non-partisan way. 
175 Dale Smith writes that ‘Legislators are (typically) dependent upon the support of a
majority of the electorate to retain office, and so lack sufficient motivation not to
mistreat any minority that the majority wishes to oppress’: ‘Can Anti-
Objectionists Support Judicial Review?’ (2006) 31 Australian Journal of Legal
Philosophy 50 at 54. In several decisions, Chief Justice Stone of the United States
Supreme Court, in noting these limits, suggested an even stronger brand of
judicial review when a court is considering legislation affecting the rights of those
who are, for one reason or another, disenfranchised or ‘politically impotent’:
United States v Carolene Products Co (1938) 304 US 144 at 152; McGoldrick v
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co (1940) 309 US 33 at 46; South Carolina State
Highway Department v Barnwell Bros Inc (1938) 303 US 177 at 185; Herbert
Wechsler, ‘Stone and the Constitution’ (1946) 46 Columbia Law Review 764 at
785–800.
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attack on civil liberties is much more likely to come from the legislator
rather than the judge, and so it is justified to give judges the power to
strike down legislation invasive of human rights.
As mentioned earlier, it may assist in meeting the democracy con-
cern to recognize that the rights are implicit in the structure of the
Constitution, the compact voted upon and accepted by the people as
sovereign, rather than merely basing the argument on the fact that
these rights exist at common law.
iii. Lack of Express Rights in the Constitution
It is sometimes said that rights should not be implied in the Constitu-
tion because the founding fathers, by and large, rejected the need for
constitutional protection of rights. Of course, this raises the original-
ism vs progressivist constitutional debate, and much has been written
about this already.
It is submitted that the lack of an express bill of rights in Australia
should not (does not) preclude the continued existence of common
law rights which cannot be abrogated by Parliament. Such rights
existed prior to the creation of the Commonwealth Constitution,
under which the federal Parliament directly, and state Parliaments
indirectly, derive their power to make laws. Their law-making powers
must be read in the light of that history and those prior rights.176 As
Toohey put it:
Just as Parliament must make unambiguous the expression of its legis-
lative will to permit executive infringement of fundamental liberties
before the courts will hold that it has done so, it might be considered
that the people must make unambiguous the expression of their con-
stitutional will to permit Parliament to enact such laws before the courts
will hold that those laws are valid.177
I would respectfully adopt comments by Deane J in Theophanous that
the argument that the failure to include an express bill of rights in the
Constitution meant there was no intention to protect such rights was
176 ‘There is an obvious tension between the plenary powers of parliament and the
requirements of morality, justice and universal human rights. The Lockean
approach resolves this tension by allowing judges to limit parliamentary
sovereignty to the extent that it allows infringement of fundamental common law
rights, such rights, on the delegation view of the Constitution, having never been
ceded to the Parliament in the first place’: Wright, above n. 108 at 188–9. See also
Brian Fitzgerald, who concludes that ‘for too many years Dicey’s theory of legal
sovereignty residing in the Parliament and political sovereignty existing in the
people has been used by those in power to the disadvantage of the ultimate
generators of power, the people’: ‘Proportionality and Australian
Constitutionalism’ (1993) 12 University of Tasmania Law Review 263 at 276.
177 See Toohey, above n. 54 at 170. See for discussion Winterton, above n. 108.
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‘flawed at every step’.178 The Ninth Amendment merely makes express
in the United States what should be implied in Australia.179
Of course, it must be conceded that the founding fathers in Aus-
tralia considered the option of including an express bill of rights in the
Constitution, but decided against it. The relevance of the intentions of
the founding fathers to interpretation of constitutional principles
today is of course a matter of conjecture.180 In any event, to the extent
that it remains relevant, the founding fathers might have avoided
including an express bill of rights because they did not think that
Parliament would trample on common law rights, influenced as they
were by Diceyan theory. One of them, Cockburn, wondered whether
any of the colonies had ever attempted to deprive a person of life,
liberty or property without due process, and was concerned that com-
ments such as ‘Pretty things these states of Australia; they have to be
prevented by provisions of the Constitution from doing the grossest
injustice’181 would be made by observers.
In other words, the founding fathers may not have experienced
occasions where Parliament did trample on common law rights, and
did not think it would do so.182 The number of statutes was also much
smaller than today.
So, to the extent that the views of the founding fathers are relevant
in constitutional interpretation today, it is submitted that their deci-
sion not to include an express bill of rights should not lead to the
conclusion that statutes might not be declared invalid because they
invade fundamental common law liberties or are inconsistent with
178 Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, citing R v
Smithers (1912) 16 CLR 99 where Griffith CJ and Barton, two founding fathers,
held that citizens had an implied (constitutional) right to visit the seat of
government and other related rights.
179 ‘under Marbury v Madison, as in Dr Bonham’s Case, the common law is, in fact,
controlling acts of the legislature’: Edwards, above n. 148 at 86.
180 Five members of the High Court recently in New South Wales v Commonwealth
(2007) 231 ALR 1 concluded that to pursue the framers’ intention was, more often
than not, to pursue a mirage (40) (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and
Crennan JJ).
181 Convention Debates, Melbourne (1898) Vol. 1, p. 688; see J.A. La Nauze, The
Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press: Melbourne,
1972) 231. Gleeson CJ in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162
explained that the history of their country had not taught the founding fathers the
need for provisions directed to the control of the legislature itself (172).
182 Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth v The Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455 at 484–5
conclude that there are ‘many statements in the Convention Debates by the
opponents of express guarantees of fundamental rights to the effect that such
guarantees were “unnecessary”’ (Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian
Federal Convention, Melbourne (1898), Vol. 1, 667, 687–8), or were effected by the
ordinary operation of the common law and embodied in the Constitution as part
of the unwritten law (Vol. 2, 1776). Geoff Lindell says that the founding fathers did
not think Parliament would act to trample upon rights: Future Directions in
Australian Constitutional Law (Federation Press: Sydney, 1994) 34. Today we
believe differently—as Douglas Edlin puts it: ‘faith in the self-restraint and
circumspection of an absolutely sovereign legislative authority seems a flimsy
means by which to prevent potential abuses of legislative power’: ‘Rule Britannia’
(2002) 52 University of Toronto Law Journal 313 at 319.
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implied rights.183 They assumed something that is not the reality of
current governance—some of their members, as well as members of
the High Court, concede that the (unexpressed) views of the founding
fathers should not control interpretation of the Constitution,184 some
of them at an early stage claimed that the Constitution contained
implied rights anyway,185 and some of them may have placed their
trust in the common law to protect rights from interference.186 They
presumably would have been aware of the American experience prior
to 1776, where laws were struck down on the basis of inconsistency
with common law rights, were aware of the contents of the English
Bill of Rights, including a statement that rights within it were ‘indubit-
able’, and were aware of several precedents, including Dr Bonham’s
Case, suggesting that legislation inconsistent with the common law
should not stand.
iv. Judicial Activism is Encouraged
Some upholders of Diceyan dogma might suggest that a finding that
Parliamentary legislative power is subject to implied constitutional
rights or fundamental common law rights is unacceptable, because
it gives too much power to unelected judges, or might encourage
‘judicial activism’, intended by those critics in a pejorative sense.
Zines, for example, claims that allowing judges to subject legislation
to common law rights ‘is to invite a judge to discover in the constitu-
tion his or her own broad political philosophy’.187 Winterton suggests
183 Deane J in Theophanous similarly concluded that despite what the founding
fathers might have thought or sometimes said, there was nothing to prevent the
implication of rights from the Constitution’s express terms of fundamental
doctrines upon which it was structured (171).
184 Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, Mason CJ,
Toohey, Gaudron JJ (128–9) and Deane J (171); in New South Wales v
Commonwealth (2007) 231 ALR 1 at 40, several members of the current High
Court spoke of the pursuit of the framers’ intention as much more often than not
to pursue a mirage (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Hayne and Crennan JJ).
185 R v Smithers (1912) 16 CLR 99 where Griffith CJ and Barton, two founding
fathers, held that citizens had an implied (constitutional) right to visit the seat of
government and other related rights.
186 At least Inglis Clark seemed to believe in the sovereignty of the people rather than
the sovereignty of Parliament, which might suggest that laws trampling on
common law liberties should not be upheld. In the 1907 Potter decision, O’Connor
J cited with approval comments by an author of a statutory interpretation text to
the effect that ‘it is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would
overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general
system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to
give any such effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in
their widest, or usual or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which
they were not really used’: Potter v Minahan (1907) 7 CLR 277 at 304. Some who
argued against express inclusion of rights in the Constitution did so because the
rights were already effected ‘by the ordinary operation of the common law’:
Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne
(1898) Vol. 2, 1776.
187 Sir Leslie Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth (Cambridge
University Press: New York, 1991) 52.
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the process will be subjective.188 Allan refers to the need for a judge
implying rights to ‘[try] not to look as though you are making it up as
you go along, of simply reading in your own political and moral
preferences’.189
Of course, the precise meaning of ‘judicial activism’ is a matter of
some debate.190 Further, one can hardly accuse of being radical a
principle applied in England more than four centuries ago, and which
provided the basis for American legal orthodoxy like Marbury more
than two centuries ago. Sir Owen Dixon, who clearly supported the
principle in his extra-judicial writings, can hardly be labelled a judicial
activist.
Eminent jurists have for centuries recognized that the law should
grow and develop through the course of decision-making,191 to reflect
changes in society. As Lord Goff noted:
It is universally recognised that judicial development of the common law
is inevitable. If it had never taken place, the common law would be the
same now as it was in the reign of King Henry II; it is because of it that
the common law is a living system of law, reacting to new events and
new ideas, and so capable of providing the citizens of this country with a
system of practical justice relevant to the times in which they live.192
So far from being a criticism, the flexibility of the common law is part
of its genius and part of the reason it has continued to serve various
societies well across several centuries. The judges have a role to play
in developing and adapting common law. Labels like ‘judicial activism’
serve to ignore this role, or seek to downplay the important role that
judges play in legal development.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
The notion that Parliament’s powers are subject to common law
human rights is not new. It was espoused more than four centuries
188 See Winterton, above n. 49 at 143. Winterton says that the content of the
supposed fundamental principle and the degree to which it is limited by
considerations of reasonableness and proportionality will differ with different
judges. While this may be so, the same may be said of existing constitutional
principles whereby a Commonwealth law is assessed for validity in terms of
whether it is ‘a law with respect to’ a particular head of power, ‘reasonably
appropriate and adapted’, ‘reasonable proportionality’ etc. The concept of
reasonable regulation appears in the jurisprudence of s. 92 and it is at the heart of
the implied free speech cases. Judges differ over the meaning of these concepts
and their application in particular cases. With respect, it does not to the writer
seem a convincing reason for not accepting the fundamental common law rights
argument.
189 See Allan, above n. 168 at 183.
190 Justice Robert French of the Federal Court, as he then was, in Judicial Activists—
Mythical Monsters? (2008) Constitutional Law Conference, ANU.
191 Sir Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (Henrie Tomes: London, 1605);
Henry Bracton, de Legibus et conscientudinibus Angliae, vols 1–4, G.E. Woodbine
(ed.) (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1915–42).
192 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln County Council [1999] 2 AC 349 at 377.
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ago, both before and after the Glorious Revolution in England. It was
adopted with great enthusiasm in the United States, and formed the
basis of that country’s acceptance of judicial review, a doctrine to
which Australia subscribes. One can see in the adoption of an express
bill of rights an attempt to express what was already implied—the
powers of Parliament were not absolute, and subject to limits involv-
ing the rights of citizens. The doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy is
a common law principle of relatively recent origin, and is difficult to
reconcile with other principles to which we ascribe. It does not fit the
reality of Australia’s constitutional arrangements, and it is hard to
reconcile with developments in the United Kingdom, as some have
recognized. Numerous High Court judges have made passing com-
ments to the effect that at least some common law rights are so
fundamental that they could not be taken away, including Sir Owen
Dixon. These common law rights may be seen to be implicit in the
constitutional structure in Australia. It may be that the High Court in
Lange was right to say that the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy
is no longer helpful in describing Australia’s system of governance.
While it is true that the founding fathers did not include an express
bill of rights in the Australian Constitution, this was because their
experience had not taught them the need to do so. They assumed that
Parliaments would not trample upon rights—they did not assume that
the common law rights that arrived with the First Fleet were being
sacrificed when colonial and then the Commonwealth Parliament was
created. In other words, the failure to include express rights should
not be taken to mean an intention that the Commonwealth and state
Parliaments would have the legislative ability to take away common
law rights. There is no evidence that the people intended to give
Parliament the power to take away rights, and the rule of law requires
that citizens know in advance before power is exercised what the
nature and ambit of the power is. If the High Court were to test the
validity of legislation against a backdrop of an implicit right to due
process enshrined in the Constitution, democracy would not suffer
but would be enhanced.
Support for this theory can be found in the work of theorists such
as Locke, in terms of the social compact. Locke denied that Parliament
would or should be omnicompetent—if citizens banded together, they
did so in order to protect rights, rather than create a body with the
ability to take them away. A theory that citizens enjoy rights that are
above interference by the Parliament is also consistent with the idea
that the people enjoy sovereignty, rather than Parliament. Given the
theoretical, judicial and extra-judicial support for the idea that at least
some human rights are above interference by Parliament, the High
Court should now accept this position. I have suggested the kinds of
rights to which I am referring. Their meaning and content would of
course evolve over the years, as the common law has always done.
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